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Outward foreign direct investment by Brazilian and Indian multinational 





The purpose of this paper is to complete an overall comparative study of outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) from BRIC countries and strategies conducted by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) whose parent companies are based in the BRICs
2
. In a sense, it is a 
follow-up to three previous companion papers (Andreff, 2013a, 2013b & 2014) which already 
compared OFDI and strategies of those MNCs based in the two post-communist transition 
economies, China and Russia, which are classified with Brazil and India into the BRICs 
group. Here the focus is on Brazilian and Indian MNCs and their OFDI using as a benchmark 
major outcomes derived from the study of Chinese and Russian multinationals (Table 1). 
Such a benchmark does not mean that we were expecting at the starting point of this research 
to find the same OFDI features and MNC strategies for firms based in Brazil and India as 
those identified for Chinese and Russian companies that have extended their investments 
abroad. To the contrary the intent is to check, against a benchmark of MNCs emerging from 
former centrally planned economies with a single (communist) party regime, how much the 
differences in Brazilian and Indian market economies with a democratic political regime over 
the past decades
3
 countervail (or not) the assumed similarities across all the BRICs.  
                                                          
1
 Professor Emeritus at the University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Honorary Member of the European 
Association for Comparative Economic Studies, Honorary President of the International Association of Sports 
Economists, and the European Sports Economics Association, former President of the French Economic 
Association.  
2
 This is a wider comparison than those already existing in the literature such as: Duanmu & Guney (2009), 
Goldstein & Pusterla (2010), Milelli, Hay & Shi (2010), Tolentino (2010), Pradhan (2011), Zhao (2011), De 
Beule & Van den Bulcke (2012), Andreff & Balcet (2013), Kothari, Kotabe & Murphy (2013). The study by 
Holtbrügge & Kreppel (2012) indeed covers all the four BRICs‟ OFDI though only with case studies of eight 
companies. 
3
 Even though India has had a system of central planning from the 1950s on (but not a centralised mandatory 
quantitative planning as in former Soviet countries) until 1991 and Brazil has endeavoured some decades of 
authoritarian political regime before the 1990s.  
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Table 1 about here 
The present paper reads as follows. Its starts with reminding in an historical perspective when 
and how first companies based in Brazil and India started up to proceed with OFDI, a final 
note comparing it with the first emerging Chinese and Russian MNCs (1). Then a brief 
empirical macro-description is provided of how Brazilian and Indian OFDI evolved over the 
past decade or so, again with a comparison to Chinese and Russian OFDI (2). Then it is 
exhibited how Brazilian and Indian MNCs have muddled through the crisis since 2008 as 
against Chinese and Russian MNCs (3). A next step consists in checking the specificities of 
Brazilian and Indian OFDI in terms of firm size and ownership, geographical orientation and 
industrial specialisation (4). The following section picks up from existing economic literature 
a comparison between the econometrically-tested determinants of Brazilian and Indian OFDI 
(5). Finally, the most significant differences of Brazilian and Indian MNCs when compared 
with Chinese and Russian MNCs are observed in the relationships between home-based 
investors abroad and the government (6). An overall comparative picture concludes (7).  
 
1. The emergence of Brazilian and Indian multinational companies 
Indian and Brazilian firms are known to have started up investing abroad earlier than Chinese 
and Russian MNCs, the latter respectively in 1979 and 1994. Indian OFDI first emerged as 
early as in the late 1950s while Brazilian OFDI dates back to the mid-1970s.  
1.1. Emerging Brazilian MNCS 
 
The first international flows of Brazilian companies investing abroad happened in the mid- 
1970s. The economic slowdown of the late 1970s which led to the 1980s crisis was a main 
reason mentioned by Brazilian entrepreneurs to explain this first wave of Brazilian OFDI. 
Domestic economic slowdown was the first factor pushing Brazilian firms to internationalise. 
At the time being banks, engineering service firms and Petrobrás expanded their activities to 
bordering countries. Between 1975 and 1980, a dozen Brazilian MNCs had already emerged 
(Andreff, 1982; Lall, 1983a).  
Data from the Brazilian Central Bank show that foreign investments were concentrated in 
financial services, up to 54% of OFDI flows in 1980 (Villela, 1983). The strong presence of 
banking investments overseas was strategically targeted to support the marked expansion of 
Brazilian firms exporting activities. Besides banking services, first Brazilian MNCs were 
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involved in other sectors such as oil exploration and production, construction and engineering, 
and a few manufacturing. Its main destination was Latin American, then African (oil and 
construction) and Middle East countries (engineering services). During the 1980s trade 
agreements motivated Brazilian MNCs in the auto parts and electrical industry to set up 
production facilities in Argentina. Villela (1983) provides a list of the largest non-financial 
investors abroad in the 1980s: Petrobràs (oil and gas), Copersucar (coffee), Mendes Junior 
(construction), Vale do Rio Doce (mining), Camargo Corrêa (engineering), Odebrecht 
(construction) and Brahma (beverages). In 1982, Brazilian MNCs were already holding 147 
subsidiaries abroad. 
Since the early 1990s, large Brazilian companies have entered a new stage in their 
internationalisation process (Cyrino et al., 2010) though Brazilian OFDI was relatively 
insignificant up to the late 1990s. In 1995, UNCTAD listed only four Brazilian (and no 
Indian) firms among the top 50 TNCs based in developing countries: Petrobras, Vale, Brahma 
and Sadia Concordia. OFDI flows soared in the 1990s as a consequence of deregulation, 
privatisation and trade liberalisation followed by Brazil‟s outward oriented economic strategy, 
as in many Latin American countries during this period of time. Consequently in the second 
half of the 1990s, due to economic and institutional reforms in Brazil, a tendency to growing 
internationalisation of Brazilian firms was registered; OFDI was triggered by a strategy of 
expanding business in foreign markets (market-seeking FDI). This process has particularly 
developed after 2002, corresponding to a recovery of the Brazilian economy from the 2001 
crisis, after it has been driven by a cycle of economic growth in developed and developing 
countries (Amal et al., 2012). 
 
1.2. Emerging Indian MNCs 
 
In a pioneering paper, Lecraw (1977) checked that nine Indian firms had already invested in 
Thailand at the time being. According to Lall (1983b), the first OFDI from India occurred as 
early as 1962 with Jay Engineering Works setting an assembly line for sewing machines in Sri 
Lanka. In fact, the really first one was the establishment of a textile mill in Ethiopia by Birlas 
in 1955 (Saikia, 2012). Indian firms began to significantly invest abroad in the 1960s, but 
India‟s restrictive OFDI regime limited them to small, minority joint ventures (JVs) in 
developing countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Malaysia Thailand and Sri Lanka. In 
manufacturing industries, seven Indian MNCs had eight subsidiaries in four less developed 
 4 
 
countries till 1968 (Agarwal, 1985). The liberalisation of OFDI policy pushed up Indian firms 
to invest abroad but under stringent conditions fixed by the state, namely with the objective of 
developing JVs with foreign partners rather than fully-owned subsidiaries.  
Indian OFDI developed in the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1976-1977, then slowing down. At 
the moment, Indian OFDI was felt – namely by the government – as a tool for export 
promotion in particular in the equipment goods industry. This drove market-seeking OFDI 
primarily in neighbouring host countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, 
and other Asian developing countries, but also in the Middle-East and few African countries, 
with a focus on countries having a significant number of people with Indian origins as local 
residents, as well as slightly in the U.K. and the USA. In the 1970s, India was reported as a 
net exporter of FDI since as a planned economy it hosted a very low level of inward FDI. In 
1980, 82% of Indian OFDI was located in the manufacturing industry and 18% in the tertiary 
sector. In 1982, India had 225 JVs in 37 developing and developed countries. Compared to 
MNCs from other BRICs, Indian MNCs were clearly benefiting from a first mover advantage. 
The major Indian MNCs in the 1980s were Birla, Thapar, Tata group, JK Group, Modi, 
Hindustan Machine Tools, Usha Martin Black, Kirloskar, Shahibag, Godrej, Larsen & 
Toubro, Sarabhai, Indian Tobacco, Mahindra & Mahindra, Nowrosjee Wadia, and Mafatlal. 
Some were partially or fully state-owned but most of them were owned by Indian family 
capital though often in collaboration with the state – public financial institutions (Grou, 1988). 
The size of their OFDI was still rather modest.  
With the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990s, targeting inward and outward FDI 
since 1994, the number of Indian firms investing abroad grew up: in the pharmaceutical 
industry, 11 companies had 15 JVs in other developing countries in the 1980s while over the 
1990-2000 period the corresponding figures reached 55 companies and 142 JVs and wholly- 
owned subsidiaries (Bruschieri, 2008); in the automotive industry 10 Indian firms had 
invested abroad in 1990-1999, and 55 in 2000-2007. Faced with a downturn of the Indian 
economy between 1998 and 2002, Indian firms internationalised operations not only for their 
survival but with specific strategies for sustained growth (Kant, 2008).  
A classical presentation of India‟s OFDI in historical perspective splits it into three phases 
(Hansen, 2010). The first phase (1970s-1980s) was mainly led by modest investments made in 
JVs in Asia and Africa and was shaped by political and regulatory restrictive government 
policies. Second was the start up phase (1990s-early 2000s) which was largely an outcome of 
more liberal government stance on FDI (see 6.2 below). The third was the take-off phase 
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(from early 2000s on) when Indian OFDI exhibited a totally different trend as compared to 
previous two phases in terms of growth, industrial composition, and geographical orientation. 
Let us end up with a paradox: Brazil and primarily India had benefited from a first mover 
advantage, compared to other BRICs, as regards investing abroad. However, at the end of the 
day, in 2009-2012, both countries are lagging behind China and Russia whose OFDI benefited 
from a last mover fast growth since the 1990s – a sort of swift catching-up process.  
 
2. Outward FDI from Brazil and India 
Brazil‟s OFDI had a fast development momentum between 1997 and 20004 in the wake of 
privatisation and deregulation; it multiplied by 7 as against Russian OFDI multiplied by 3, 
Indian OFDI multiplied by 2 and Chinese OFDI
5
 increasing by 33% over 1997-2000 (Table 
2). For all the BRICs, high-speed OFDI growth has only taken place in the 21st century. 
However Brazilian OFDI stock in 2000-2007, multiplied by 2.5 and grew exactly at the same 
pace as the world OFDI stock overall (Table 4); consequently, its pace was passed over by 
OFDI stock from China (x 3.5), Russia (x 13) and India (x 16). Despite its impressive growth, 
Indian OFDI stock remained by far quite smaller than the Russian (8 times smaller), Brazilian 
(4 times) and Chinese (3 times) ones in 2007. On the brink of financial crisis, with regards to 
investing abroad, the major BRIC was Russia whereas the laggard was India, with Brazil and 
China in between. This confirms that Russian OFDI achieved a world record in terms of 
growth from 2000 to 2007 (Andreff, 2014), but Brazil performed rather well in comparison, 
keeping a second rank standing among the BRICs after Russia as regards its OFDI stock. 
Indian was the fastest growing source of OFDI flows among the BRICs right before the crisis. 
.  
Table 2 about here 
Looking at Table 3, and with reference to Dunning‟s IDP model (Dunning, 1981; Dunning & 
Narula, 1998)
6
, Brazil exhibits a quite lower OFDI/GDP ratio than Russia – twice lower from 
                                                          
4
 However, its growth pace was slower than OFDI from other Latin American countries such as Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela (Daniels, Krug & Trevino, 2007).  
5
 All the comments refer to OFDI from mainland China; on the additional role of Hong Kong OFDI see, among 
others, Andreff (2014).  
6
 One paper raises some doubt about Indian inward and outward FDI exactly matching the stylized IDP model 
(Verma & Brennan, 2011), but the study is too much macroeconomic to be convincing since it neglects both 
sectoral and bilateral dimensions of FDI.  
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1999 to 2011 – while it is much higher than in India and China which compare in this respect. 
If an OFDI/GDP ratio higher than 5% were assumed to be required for a country to be in the 
third stage of IDP model (Andreff, 2003a), Brazil and Russia reached it in the early 2000s 
while India and China attained such stage only by 2011. With regards to the outward/inward 
FDI stock ratio, Brazil and India had the lowest in 1999; this ratio multiplied by more than 5 
in Brazil between 2000 and 2007 and was only outperformed by Russian OFDI at this date. 
Due to the crisis, of which Brazilian and Russian OFDI suffered more than their Indian and 
Chinese counterparts (see 3 below), in 2011 Brazil was lagging behind India and China as to 
the outward/inward FDI stock ratio, and of course Russia. However, if a 25% ratio is 
hypothetically retained for qualifying the third stage of IDP model all the BRICs stick to the 
criteria in 2007 as well as in 2011, with only Russia having filled it before 1999. For the first 
time in history, in 2006 Brazilian FDI outflow abroad outweighed the amount of equivalent 
inflow FDI in Brazil. 
Table 3 about here 
3. Brazilian and Indian outward FDI muddling through the crisis 
 
Global FDI flows sharply slowed down during the 2008 financial crisis, and again in its 2010-
2012 aftermaths. The financial crisis had a negative effect on OFDI from emerging markets as 
well. However, emerging market MNC contribution to OFDI was more resilient to the crisis 
and less volatile than that of other MNCs, although it too went through cycles (Ramamurti, 
2011). While overall world OFDI significantly and repeatedly slowed down in 2008, 2010 
and 2011 (Table 4), the situation was scattered among the BRICs as regards OFDI 
fluctuations during the crisis.  
Russian OFDI stock was by far the most unstable and the most affected by crisis (Andreff, 
2014) suffering a 20% decrease in 2008, and again 16% down in 2011; but in between its 
recovery was the strongest in the world with the highest growth rate (74%) in 2010. On the 
other hand, though fluctuating, Chinese OFDI stock kept on growing at between 23% and 
55% a rate per year from 2008 to 2012: the most stable and the least affected by crisis. 
Brazilian and Indian OFDI stocks stand somewhere in between. Indian OFDI stock was still 
one of the fastest growing in the world in 2008 (110%) but dropped off significantly in 2009 
and since then its growth rate is on a decreasing slope down to 6% in 2012. Brazilian OFDI 
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stock is the most unstable after the Russian one, decreasing by 3% in 2009 and sticking to a 
12% to 15% growth rate since then.  
Table 4 about here 
 
The rather high growth rate (25%) of Brazilian OFDI stock in 2008 is mainly due to intra-
company loans from parent companies to underperforming subsidiaries abroad as well as new 
acquisitions of mining and natural-resource-based industries (UNCTAD, 2009). In 2009, most 
likely in response to worldwide economic and financial crisis, FDI outflows from Brazil were 
negative, with Brazilian parent companies repatriating $10 billion from their foreign 
subsidiaries through intra-company transfers. The combination of Brazilian real depreciation 
and loss of market value of overseas equity did not result in more ventures abroad for 
Brazilian companies. The latter were strongly hit by tightened international credit conditions 
and uncertainty fuelled by economic crisis. Trans-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
by Brazilian MNCs plummeted sharply in 2009, although the effects of crisis in Brazil were 
still relatively limited. In 2010, Brazil‟s GDP growth was 7.5%. Equity investments made by 
Brazilian MNCs in foreign subsidiaries reached $11.5 billion in 2010. Since 2010, Brazilian 
OFDI stock located in Europe has considerably raised namely in Austria, through special 
purpose entities and takeovers of Austrian banks.  
Indian OFDI rate of growth peaked up at 98% per year in 2004-2007 (Pradhan, 2010). This 
growth rate declined since 2008 though, on average, less than in other BRICs but China. 
Indian MNCs had borrowed heavily in dollars to finance mega trans-border M&As. They 
were thus hit badly by the sharp rupee depreciation and tightened international credit 
conditions. Since 2008 continuously tumbling trans-border M&As by Indian MNCs
7
 were 
driving the decline in OFDI growth, affecting only slightly OFDI in services while it turned 
out to be a real decrease in manufacturing industry. After years of overseas expansion, Indian 
firms started consolidating their foreign operations and adjusting to the crisis. Indian MNCs 
suffered from a credit crunch and difficulties in raising financial resources. The sudden 
depreciation of Indian rupee against US dollar led to heavy losses for those Indian MNCs 
which had acquired derivatives and to an increase of their overseas debt in domestic currency. 
                                                          
7
 Between 2007 and 2009, the number of overseas M&As plummeted from 243 to 82; the total trans-border 
M&A value fell from $32.8 billion to $1.4 billion; and the average M&A size decreased from $135 million in 
2007 to $17 million in 2009. 
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Nevertheless, after Chinese MNCs, the Indian ones are the least affected by crisis among the 
BRICs‟ MNCs so far. 
 
4. Specificities of outward FDI from Brazil and India 
 
In terms of OFDI stock, India became the world‟s 34th largest outward investor in 2007 
whereas Brazil had reached the 19th rank the same year as against Russia the 12th, and 
mainland China the 23rd. In 2012, OFDI stock from Brazil was the 18
th
 most important 
source of OFDI worldwide and Indian OFDI the 23
rd
, as against Russian OFDI being the 15
th
 
and Chinese OFDI the 12
th
. From 2007 to 2012, during the crisis, all the BRICs have climbed 
this ranking based on UNCTAD OFDI data, except Russia. In the past recent years, post-
communist transition economies are the most significant foreign investors among the BRICs 
as compared to the two major countries emerging from under-development.  
 4.1. Evolving major Brazilian and Indian multinational companies 
 
In the 1990s and up to 1999 Reliance Industries was the only Indian MNC that showed up 
among the biggest 50 MNCs from developing countries; then it disappeared from the 
UNCTAD ranking. Brazilian MNCs were four (Petrobras, Vale, Brahma, Souza Cruz) in this 
top 50 group. In 2006, among the biggest 100 MNCs from developing countries were found 
three Brazilan (Petrobras, Vale, Gerdau) and two Indian (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, 
Ranbaxy Laboratories) firms.  
 
4.1.1. Brazilian MNCs: global players and small and medium-sized enterprises 
 
There were altogether more than 1000 Brazilian firms that had invested abroad in the late 
1990s (Gammeltoft, 2008); this number compares with the one for Russian MNCs (Andreff, 
2014). In 2006, a KPMG study checked that 885 Brazilian MNCs had invested in 52 countries 
where they were employing 77000 people. Most of them were privately-owned companies 
though some significant MNCs were partly state-owned like Petrobras. In 2007, using the 
UNCTAD transnationality index, the most transnationalised Brazilian companies were 
Gerdau, Sabo (auto parts), Marfrig, Vale and Metalfrio. Foreign subsidiaries of 40 Brazilian 
MNCs were located 46% in Latin America, 17.1% in North America, 20.6% in Europe, 4.6% 
in Africa, 10.7% in Asia, and 0.4% in Oceania (Cyrino et al., 2010). However, some Brazilian 
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small and medium sized companies had become MNCs. The group of Brazilian firms with 
significant amounts of OFDI is around 100 of which about 50 „global players‟ (Carvalho et 
al., 2010). In 2013, seven Brazilian MNCs were listed in the Fortune 500 biggest companies 
in the world: Petrobras, Banco de Brasil, Bradesco, Vale, JBS, Itau, Ultrapar Holdings, and 
Brazilian Distribution. 
Table 5 about here 
In the past recent years, the above-mentioned pioneering Brazilian MNCs have been joined by 
a larger group of Brazilian companies investing abroad, namely those listed in Table 5, as 
well as Petroflex (chemicals), CVRD (mining and metals), Usiminas (steel), Tupy (steel) Aco 
Altona (metal products), Cotia Trading (metallurgy and construction), Camargo Corrêa 
(construction), Tigre (construction), Metodo Engenharia (construction), Souza Cruz 
(diversified), Ultrapar (diversified), Artecola (chemicals), Potobello (ceramics), Aracruz 
Celulose (pulp and paper, now FIBRIA), Suzano (paper and pulp), Itautec (information 
technology), Sabo (car parts), Duas Rodas (motorbikes), Duratex (furniture), Ambev 
(beverages), Sadia (food & beverages), Perdigão (food), and Unibanco (banking).    
 
4.1.2: Indian MNCs: conglomerates and others 
 
Indian firms investing abroad before the 1990s were mostly conglomerates (Lall, 1982) 
competing into those sectors that required simple technology, low product differentiation and 
more labour intensive techniques but they have worked in developing countries more 
efficiently than developed countries. The government liberalisation policies changed the size 
distribution of Indian MNCs from big industrial houses with minority stake in pre-1991 
period mainly due to the prevailing restrictive regime to small firms. After a first liberalisation 
phase (see 6.2 below), continual industrialisation in the domestic market, experience attained 
from home and abroad, financial relaxation and local government supports paved the way for 
Indian MNCs to invest more globally (Hansen, 2003). They not only invested into developing 
countries and the share of their OFDI into developed countries increased after 1990 (Arockia 
Baskaran & Chaarlas, 2012). Faced with a downturn of the Indian economy between 1998 
and 2002, Indian firms internationalised operations for their survival but also with specific 
strategies for sustained growth (Kant, 2008).  
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Indian OFDI is undertaken primarily by publicly-listed, private firms and, as yet, only a 
handful of Indian public-sector firms have internationalised. Unlike Chinese MNCs, they do 
not enjoy „go global‟ privileges (Andreff, 2014). The conglomerate structure of some well-
known Indian MNCs is sometimes considered as a key factor of their success (Ruet, 2010). It 
helped them in catching up in production process-efficiency and technology while raising 
their borrowing capacity in the international market. Those non conglomerate Indian firms 
that became MNCs often used foreign networks, namely parental networks (Elango & 
Pattnaik, 2007) for those MNCs launched by big families like the Kalyani‟s (Bharat Forge), 
the Mahindra brothers, Dilip Shanghvi (Sun Pharmaceuticals), Nicholas Piramal and so on.  
In 2007, the number of Indian MNCs stood at 3149, operating across 122 countries, but many 
had a relatively small size, namely compared with Chinese MNCs. In 2008, seven Indian 
firms were listed in the Fortune 500 biggest companies of the world: Indian Oil, Reliance 
Industries, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum, Tata Steel, Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation and State Bank of India. In 2013, they were eight, the same plus Tata Motors, as 
against 89 Chinese companies and 7 Russian companies. Some of these biggest Indian firms 
did not yet show up among the biggest Indian MNCs in 2006 (Table 6). 
  
Table 6 about here 
Beyond those listed in Table 6, a number of Indian MNCS are well known namely in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Ajanta Pharma, Aurobindo Pharma, Wockhardt, Matrix 
Laboratories, Piramal Healthcare), information technology (IT) services (Aptech, Mastek, 
Firstsource Solutions, 3i Infotech,  Mphasis Ltd, Reliance Infocomm, Videocon Industries, 
Satyam Computer Services, iFlex Solutions, Polaris Software, Pentasoft Technologies), 
chemicals (Orchid Chemicals, Nirma, United Phosphorus), engineering (L&T, Voltas and 
Usha Beltron, Asian Paints), as well as Essel Packaging, Subex Azure, Hotel Leela, Bajaj 
Hindustan group, Havells India, JSW Steel, Punj Lloyd, Bharti Airtel, Essar Steel Holdings, 
United Spirits, GMR Infrastructure, Opto Circuits India, NTPC, GAIL (Gas Authority of 
India Ltd), Era group, and Ispat Industries. 
 




Brazilian MNCs invest abroad by means of both greenfield investment and trans-border 
M&As. For instance, Camargo Corrêa acquired Loma Negra (Argentine) in 2005, Marco Polo 
created a JV with Tata Motors (India) in 2006 setting up the biggest bus plant in the world, 
Vale acquired INCO (Canada) in 2006 and AMCI Holdings (Australia) in 2007, a year when 
Votorantim acquired Acerias Paz del Rio (Colombia), Gerdau acquired Chaparral Steel (US), 
JBS-Friboi acquired Swift Foods (US); with the latter acquisition, JBS had become a world‟s 
slaughterhouse group with the largest capacity of processing worldwide. Marfrig acquired 
Mirab (Argentina) and Ambev merged with Interbrew in 2008.  
 
Table 7 about here 
Overseas acquisitions have gained strength, especially due to the stabilisation of the Brazilian 
economy and the appreciation of real face to dollar. An appreciated currency made M&As 
much cheaper, namely in the USA. Brazilian MNCs have taken this opportunity to expand 
their market and access natural resources that are not available in domestic market: it was the 
purpose of Vale-Inco Steel, Votorantim-US Zinc, and Gerdau-Chaparral Steel acquisitions, 
among others. The search for technological assets that are not available to firms in their 
domestic market is an important driver of OFDI in general, and has become a central 
motivation for firms from emerging markets to internationalise (Matthews, 2002; Dunning et 
al., 2008; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, in Brazil, technology-seeking OFDI, this 
specific form of asset-seeking strategy, responds of only 7.2 percent of sampled MNCs 
(Carvalho, 2009); the recent increase in trans-border M&As might be a signal that Brazilian 
MNCs are seeking now to augment their strategic position through such investment. 
 
Table 8 about here 
Though relatively small in a global context, Indian MNCs are notable for their global buy-
outs of enterprises far larger than themselves. Indian MNCs started seriously adopting 
overseas M&As in the 2000s. Indian MNCs have systematically acquired leading developed 
country firms, rapidly to boost domain expertise, technological competitiveness, market size, 
and brand recognition. In some cases, these acquisitions were specifically undertaken to attain 
global size and status, and to build new competitive advantages by combining the best 
international technology with low-cost Indian labour (Andreff & Balcet, 2013). Severe 
domestic competition triggered increasingly larger strategic asset-seeking trans-border M&As 
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in sectors such as the automotive industry (Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra), auto-
components (Bharat Forge), electronics (Videocon), electrical machinery (Crompton Greaves) 
and the metals sector (Tata Steel, Hindalco, Essar Steel, Jindal Steel). In order to improve 
their world image, Indian MNCs were attempting to acquire firms with established and 
prestigious brands, for example, Tata Motors‟ purchase of Jaguar and Ford assets. While the 
largest trans-border M&As were smaller than $500 million in the early 2000s, they were 
higher than $10 billion after the mid-2000s with the record Arcelor takeover by Mittal ($47 
billion). Many Indian firms also used M&As to bring home new products and services and 
build competitive strength in India, which also explains the dominance of natural resource-
seeking investments in India‟s recent trans-border M&As. 
  
4.1.4. Predominant strategies of Brazilian and Indian MNCs  
 
Since the very beginning, Brazilian MNCs had adopted either an export-substitution or an 
export-complementing OFDI strategy that is a market seeking strategy in any case. The latter 
was fuelled in the long run by trade liberalisation at home and abroad. From Table 7, one can 
infer that trans-border M&As by Brazilian MNCs target acquiring foreign companies geared 
towards consumer markets (food, services, banking), which confirms market-oriented OFDI. 
Then come M&As with foreign competitors for natural resources (petroleum, gas, various 
ores), and just one trans-border M&A is asset-seeking in information retrieval. Completed 
with the presence of Petrobras and Vale among the biggest MNCs, this highlights a resource 
seeking OFDI strategy. Thus, predominantly Brazilian MNCs‟ strategy is market-seeking, to 
some extent resource-seeking and to a much lesser degree, and only recently, technological 
asset-seeking, less than 10% of declared OFDI motives. Despite the rise of some big 
investors, mostly in the extractive sector, Brazilian MNCs have not yet developed a global 
strategy
8
, much less than Chinese and Indian MNCs, even though Brazil is still the main 
source of investment from the group of Latin American countries. There is no sign of an 
efficiency-seeking strategy with relocating production units in low unit labour cost countries.  
Early Indian OFDI was market-seeking and concentrated in developing countries where there 
was little technological competition. Indian MNCs invested abroad largely to circumvent a 
stagnant domestic market and policy restrictions on large firms‟ growth stemming from the 
                                                          
8
 Such as it is defined in Andreff (2003b).  
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Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and 
licensing regulation and reservation policies for public-owned and small scale sector 
(Pradhan, 2008a). In the 1990s, Indian OFDI became more high-tech and trade supporting, as 
Indian IT firms – such as Infosys, Wipro or Satyam – began to win large global contracts and 
located in developed countries to be close to key clients. Indian pharmaceutical firms – such 
as Ranbaxy, Dr Reddy‟s Laboratories, Sun Pharmaceuticals, Biocon – followed the same 
route to break into Western generic markets. India‟s pharmaceutical companies looked for 
new unregulated markets for their generic drugs while seeking to acquire facilities that have 
regulatory clearance in regulated markets such as the USA and Western Europe.  
Some Indian firms‟ have persistently pursued natural resources. This resource seeking 
strategy is primarily conducted by the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), 
but also India‟s Suzlon Energy Ltd, the world‟s fifth largest wind turbine manufacturer, and 
Hindalco‟s acquisition of copper mines in Australia while the market seeking strategy is 
widespread among privately-owned Indian MNCs. Resource-seeking OFDI aims at ensuring 
that a stable and secure supply of resources is available to fuel the country‟s energy-intensive 
growth. There has recently been a surge in resource seeking OFDI by Indian MNCs, 
especially to acquire energy resources in Australia, Indonesia and Africa. Indian OFDI to the 
US and Western Europe has taken off since 2000. The major driver of this take off is to get an access 
to better R&D and skill infrastructure, and available strategic assets. This (technological) 
asset-seeking strategy reflects an aspiration by Indian MNCs to buy technology, processes, 
and management know-how. This is particularly important for Indian pharmaceutical MNCs 
that are looking to expand their R&D base. 
Finally, as trade barriers decline, some Indian MNCs are undertaking industrial restructuring 
with creating regional production networks, which looks like an efficiency-seeking strategy 
though it is not heavily based on a search for lower unit labour cost
9
. Indian IT companies like 
Tata Consultancy Services and Infosys have established major global sourcing bases in China. 
Similarly, Tata Motors‟ acquisition of Daewoo Heavy Vehicles of South Korea in 2005 has 
led to a regional production networking strategy whereby small and medium-sized vehicles 
are manufactured in Indian plants and sold through Daewoo outlets and brands while, 
simultaneously, heavy trucks built at the Daewoo plant are sold by Tata outlets in India and 
other countries under Tata brand name. 
                                                          
9
 Since a low unit labour cost is a typical home country‟s advantage for Indian MNCs that may trigger OFDI 
though not to even lower unit labour cost areas (see Andreff & Balcet, 2013).  
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A survey of Indian MNCs revealed that market access was the most significant motive of their 
OFDI for 51% of the respondents, followed by efficiency-seeking (22%), resource-seeking 
(13%) and created-asset-seeking (14%) (Nayyar, 2008). More generally, many Indian MNCs 
are attempting to globalise their businesses and sources of revenues as a means of reducing 
dependence on the Indian market and domestic business cycle. It may be a first step toward a 
global strategy as the one sketched in Andreff (2003b). 
 
4.2. Geographical specificities of Brazilian and Indian outward FDI 
 
The distribution of Brazil‟s OFDI and its former concentration in the Americas has somewhat 
changed over time. Data from the Central Bank of Brazil suggest that, between 2001 and 
2010, there has been a systematic decrease in the participation of Brazilian OFDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, coupled with an expansion in Europe and the USA (Table 9). 
However in 2001-2010, on average, the top host countries of Brazilian OFDI were Caribbean 
tax havens such as Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bahamas, Panama, Netherlands 
Antilles, Bermudas and Belize, and also Luxembourg. In 2008, Cayman Islands stood at 43% 
of Brazil‟s total OFDI stock (and still 16% in 2012) while 91% of the annual cross-border 
intra-company transfers of Brazilian MNCs were with tax havens. In 2010, these share 
declined to 79%. FDI outflows to tax havens often flow back to Brazil, mainly in the form of 
intra-company transfers. However this sort of “round tripping” seems to be less widespread 
than in the case of Russian and Chinese OFDI (Andreff, 2014). In 2012, the share of tax 
havens among host countries was 39.4% of total Brazilian OFDI. Fiscal regulation in Brazil 
seemingly induces investment in tax havens to escape regulatory and tax obligations. This 
suggests that Brazilian MNCs undertake trans-shipping FDI in tax-haven countries while 
waiting for good opportunities to make productive investment in third countries. This 
behaviour is different from that of Chinese MNCs that tend to be involved in round tripping 
FDI due to favorable conditions offered by Chinese government to foreign investors. 
 
Table 9 about here 
A share of Brazilian OFDI concentrates in America (14.4% of total in 2012), in particular 
neighbouring Latin American countries (6.3%), except tax havens; but a high level of regional 
concentration, particularly in North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
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together accounted for 79% of all FDI stock from Brazil between 2001 and 2008, now 
belongs to the past. As MNCs from other BRICs, in the past decade Brazilian MNCs have re-
oriented their investment abroad toward Europe (44.7% of total in 2012) which is now the 
major host area for Brazilian OFDI. Among the first 32 host countries for Brazilian OFDI 
listed in Table 9 – with a 0.1% share or more – just one developing country shows up that is 
Angola, a Portuguese-speaking country. Mozambique is further down the list. Overall this 
means that Brazilian MNCs are not attracted in less developed countries neither by their 
markets nor their unit labour cost so far; they invest in such countries basically for securing 
some natural resources. 
OFDI of India‟s early MNCs went mostly into developing countries, accounting for 68.6% of 
overall Indian OFDI flows in 1961-1969. During the 1960s, Indian MNCs were interested in 
tapping business opportunities open by industrialisation programmes in some African 
countries that had recently achieved their independence. Indian MNCs also were attracted to 
Africa because of the historical business link established since British colonial era and the 
presence of significant size of Indian origin population. Thus, Africa emerged as the largest 
host developing region for Indian OFDI. The other region that attracted Indian OFDI is Asia-
Oceania; the geographical proximity, cultural linkages and similarity of institutions inherited 
from colonial rule appear to be important factors of location in neighbouring Asian countries. 
Developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Europe and CIS, 
largely due to geographical distance, language barriers, and weak trade links, failed to attract 
any Indian OFDI during this period.  
The share of developing countries further increased in the 1970s to attain its highest share 
ever: 96%. During the 1970s-1980s, Indian OFDI into Africa declined mainly because of 
growing policy restrictions on inward FDI, political violence and internal strife. The attraction 
of developing regions to Indian OFDI continued to be very high in the 1980s though 
reoriented toward Asia as the major host region in 1970-1999. With the liberalisation of 
Indian OFDI policy regime in the 1990s, Indian MNCs intensified their investment in 
developing countries across different sub-regional groups. Almost all developing sub-regions 
experienced rapid growth in Indian OFDI led by a growing number of Indian parent 
companies. Developed countries started enhancing their position since the 1990s and had 
overtaken developing countries in 2000-2007 as the most attractive host region; however 
developing countries continued to be important locations for OFDI by Indian MNCs.  
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The geographical pattern of Indian OFDI in developing countries has shown trends of spatial 
diversification during 2000-2007, the host Asia-Oceania region received about 39% of Indian 
OFDI, followed by Africa with 34%, South-East Europe and CIS with 15% and Latin 
America and Caribbean with 13%. The expansion of outward investing Indian MNCs into 
South-East Europe and CIS sub-region started in 1979. Until now, Indian state-owned oil 
MNCs are still building an increased presence in natural-resource-based industries in African 
countries. Over 1961-2007, a total of 1674 Indian parent companies invested more than $10.9 
billion in as many as 92 developing countries. 
While in a first pre-1991 wave, Indian OFDI was concentrated in developing countries two 
next waves in the 1990s and the 2000s shifted toward M&As in developed countries (Kumar, 
2007); Indian OFDI in the latter has reached about 60% of total OFDI. The last wave was led 
by Indian pharmaceutical MNCs that started up locating direct investment in Latin American 
countries, in particular Brazil, since 1999 (Sweet, 2010). Over a half of India‟s total 2002-
2009 OFDI went into developed countries, most of them in the form of M&As. In fact, since 
2000, Indian MNCs have used trans-border M&As as the main mode of entry into developed 
countries, and greenfield investment into developing ones. Indian MNCs continue to invest in 
developed-country based companies, particularly now that they are more affordable due to the 
global crisis. The rise of host developed countries is also due to the adoption of overseas 
acquisitions by a large number of Indian MNCs to access foreign technologies and knowledge 
mostly concentrated in innovation driven developed region (Pradhan, 2008a). The improved 
attractiveness of developed countries to Indian OFDI is also rooted in the rise of service firms 
like software, communication, etc., as global players mostly focused on service-dominated 
developed countries. 
 
Table 10 about here 
Since the 2000s (Table 10), the geographical distribution of Indian OFDI is between 
neighbouring countries (Singapore, Mauritius, Russia, China), major developed countries 
(Netherlands, USA, UK, Denmark) and tax havens (Channel Islands, i.e. Jersey, Guernsey, 
Cyprus, Switzerland, British Virgin Islands). Such a distribution is quite similar to the one 
observed with Brazil, China and Russia OFDI. The share of round tripping in Indian OFDI 
must be lower than in the last two cases though the great bulk of OFDI channeled from India 
to small countries such as Singapore, Mauritius, Cyprus and British Virgin Islands is 
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ultimately geared toward third countries. Singapore is now the largest host to Indian OFDI. 
This is due to a sudden jump in OFDI after the two countries signed a Comprehensive 




4.3. Industrial specificities of Brazilian and Indian outward FDI 
 
Brazilian MNCs primarily expand abroad in the tertiary sector – over 88% of all OFDI until 
2007 (Table 10), which compares with Chinese OFDI 72% concentration in the services 
industry in 2007, and 74% in 2010 (Andreff, 2014). Crisis has affected the industrial 
distribution of Brazilian OFDI since the share of the tertiary sector fell down to 59% while its 
share in the primary sector grew from 2-3% up to 31%; the above-listed trans-border M&As 
in 2008-2010 were many in the primary sector for securing natural resource supply in times of 
crisis. The manufacturing industry still remains a minor sector for Brazilian OFDI which 
explains that an efficiency-seeking relocation of production in view of lowering unit labour 
costs has not really emerged so far. A significant share of OFDI in resource-based sectors and 
quite few manufacturing firms also reveal the comparative advantages of a resource rich 
country, a characteristic that Brazilian OFDI shares to some extent with Russian OFDI 
(Andreff, 2014) up to the present times.  
 
Table 11 about here 
Tolentino (2000) contended that Brazilian MNCs had the disadvantage of not having global 
brands (in most cases not even strong national brands) and, most important, had neither 
attained worldwide technological leadership nor developed significant technological 
advantage to compete abroad. Nevertheless, some Brazilian MNCs have significantly invested 
in R&D expenditures abroad, but not yet in very high-tec industries like MNCs from 
developed countries, and even in less high-tech industries when compared to Indian or 
Chinese MNCs (Galina & Moura, 2013). Relying on seven case studies
11
, the authors found 
that Brazilian MNCs basically internationalise Product Development (not the whole R&D 
                                                          
10 In the 1990s, Russia dominated Indian OFDI, largely due to a rupee-rouble agreement which enabled Indian 
MNCs to conduct Russian trade and investment in rupees. 
11
 Of the following Brazilian MNCs: Embraco, Gerdau, Marcopolo, SantistaTêxtil, Smar, Tigre, and WEG. 
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process) while Research properly speaking remains in the headquarters in Brazil. Adaptation 
of products to local markets is often observed as a factor that led to internationalise R&D.  
With regards to technology-driven factors when internationalising R&D a decisive factor is 
partnership with local suppliers for product or technology development. A second factor is 
technological asset-seeking that translates into the acquisition of offshore units that already 
included technology development capabilities. Maehler et al. (2011) have shown with a case 
study of four Brazilian subsidiaries located in Portugal, in different industries, that there are 
frequent innovations taking place in Portuguese subsidiaries which are typically incremental 
in nature and occur in strong interaction with local markets, especially with customers 
contributing with suggestions and influence on the new products creation in the subsidiaries. 
At odds with Russian and Chinese MNCs strategy of tapping technological assets abroad, 
Fleury et al. (2013) contend that Brazilian MNCs derive innovative capabilities from core 
competences and competence formation at firm level which are influenced by the national 
environment. Thus Brazilian MNCs which do not exhibit the expected strength in R&D are 
able to combine their organisational competences and manage to develop innovative 
capabilities as a springboard for their internationalisation. 
Overall, the change in industrial composition of Indian OFDI reflects a change in their 
strategies from essentially market-seeking to more asset-seeking (Kumar, 2007). Until 1990, 
Indian OFDI concentrated in manufacturing industry, in particular in pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals. However there was a first relative shift in OFDI by Indian MNCs from 
manufacturing in the 1960s-1970s to services in the 1980s. Inefficiencies and low 
productivity in the Indian manufacturing industry due to inward looking policies led to a 
slowdown in OFDI from this industry while the relatively faster growing service sector in the 
national economy increased its share in Indian OFDI. In the pre-1991 period market-seeking 
OFDI developed on the basis of Indian firms‟ intermediate technology in relatively low 
technology industries such as light engineering (Lall, 1986). The main technological 
advantage that Indian MNCs achieved through absorbing, assimilating, adapting and reverse 
engineering of foreign technologies offered limited scope for exploitation in developed 
countries. The modified foreign technologies to suit local demand and factor conditions rather 
provided Indian MNCs certain competitive advantages in other developing countries having 
similar economic conditions to India‟s.  
Since 1991, about 60% of Indian OFDI concentrated in the tertiary sector in IT, 
communication, software and media, trade, banking and finance. Within the manufacturing 
 19 
 
sector, industries such as power generation, electronic equipment, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and software development were among the dominant 
investors abroad. Knowledge based industries - software and IT, depository institutions, 
professional, technical and scientific services – have heavily invested abroad since 2000. This 
maturing technological strength of large-sized Indian MNCs is now allowing them to exploit 
their competitive advantages even in developed countries in the 2000s. 
 
Table 12 about here 
Consequently, in the 2000s, manufacturing has displaced services as the principal OFDI 
industry, and the primary sector‟s share is now growing quickly (Table 12). While 
pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics and automotives accounted for the bulk of 
manufacturing OFDI in the first half of the decade, the second half has seen a concentration in 
metals, energy and natural resource investments, and increasing activity by consumer goods 
and food and beverage firms. In the aftermath of global economic crisis, Indian OFDI flows
12
 
shifted again toward services since 2010. While IT initially dominated services OFDI, 
investment in other services industries, such as financial and insurance services, entertainment 
and broadcasting, construction, and telecommunications, is now mounting. 
 
5. The determinants of Brazilian and Indian OFDI 
The determinants of OFDI may be looked for in home country – the so-called push factors – 
then primarily explaining its industrial distribution abroad, or they may be searched in factors 
that pull OFDI from a given home country to various host countries, then explaining its 
geographical distribution (Andreff, 2014). The research of pull factors is predominant in the 
studies about BRICs‟ OFDI, but in the case of Brazilian OFDI push factors are acknowledged 
to have had a significant role.  
 
 5.1. The determinants of Brazilian OFDI 
 
                                                          
12
 Since Indian data about OFDI are basically published in terms of flows, they are more fluctuating than in other 
BRICs which publish OFDI stock; consequently, the industrial distribution of OFDI flows (India) appears to be 
more fluctuating than the industrial distribution of OFDI stock in other BRICs (including Brazil).  
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In line with the theoretical justification provided by the IDP model (Dunning, 1981; Dunning 
& Naruda, 1998), testing push factors that trigger a trade-off between investing in the 
domestic economy and abroad should be done properly (Andreff, 2003a). Carvalho (2009) 
has adopted the most simplified version of IDP model in case of Brazilian OFDI. A quadratic 
function is supposed to reveal the expected pattern of the relationship between net outward 
foreign investment (outward direct minus inward direct investment) and the development path 
of the Brazilian economy (GNI: gross national income): 
NOI pc = + 1 GNIpcap + 2 GNIpcap2 +μ (1) 
and has been tested successfully.  
However Ellström & Engblad (2009) have found that though the shape of Brazilian IDP 
correlates with the conceptual IDP model, the underlying factors causing the shifts in net 
outward investment are not due to development of the country´s OLI-advantages; it was 
initially caused by economic reforms and later by global business cycles as in many late 
outward investor countries such as Brazil. Ellström & Engblad conclude that the IDP theory 
explains the development of Brazil‟s FDI only to a limited extent. Four important push factors 
led Brazilian firms to become new MNCs, as it is contended by Fleury & Fleury (2009): the 
privatization process; the consolidation of the domestic consumer goods industry; the 
denationalisation of the durable goods industry; and the creation of Mercosur. 
Concer et al. (2010)
13
 have assessed the common wisdom prevailing in Brazil that accounts 
for a push factor through which local companies go abroad in response to exchange rate 
movements. Their results stress that although the strong exchange rate in Brazil is often 
blamed for forcing companies to invest abroad, the evidence found in the aggregate data 
suggests that there is not a significant relationship between the level of foreign exchange rate 
and Brazilian OFDI. All in all, more push factors of OFDI from Brazil have been successfully 
tested or assessed than for Russian and Chinese OFDI (Andreff, 2014). This does not mean 
that domestic variables do not explain OFDI in the two latter cases – namely think of massive 
round tripping OFDI – but opens a wide avenue for further research in comparing push factors 
that trigger (or not) OFDI from all the BRICs.  
Amal et al. (2012) have tested the determinants of Brazilian OFDI with explanatory variables 
that are pull factors attracting Brazilian investment in foreign host countries. Relying on host 
country data, the authors estimated a model for Brazilian OFDI on a dataset comprising eight 
                                                          
13
 The authors use time series econometrics with a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model. 
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years (2002-09) and 22 host countries
14
. The model tested is as follows (an asterisk means 
that the coefficient of a variable is statistically significant): 
OFDI = f (GDPi*, GDPi/POPi, INFi*, RERi*, TRDi*, CDi*, GDi*, CCi*, GEi*, PSi, RLi*, 
RQi, VAi*)  (2) 
with: GDPi  the gross domestic country of a host country i; GDPi/POPi: GDP per inhabitant 
in country i; INFi: inflation rate in country i; RERi: real exchange rate between country i‟s 
currency and the real; TRDi: trade flows (import, export) between Brazil and country i; CDi: 
cultural distance between Brazil and country i; GDi: geographical distance between Brazil 
and country i; CCi: control of corruption in country i; GEi: government effectiveness in 
country i; PSi: political stability and absence of violence / terrorism in country i; RLi: rule of 
law (law enforcement) in country i; RQi : quality of regulation in country i; VAi *: voice and 
accountability in country i.  
Brazilian OFDI appears to be positively correlated to host country‟s economic performance, 
namely the size of its domestic market assessed by GDP, macroeconomic stability (inflation, 
real exchange rate), and trade openness. Since Brazilian OFDI is positively correlated to the 
size of the host country, the higher is a host country‟s GDP, the higher Brazilian OFDI to that 
country. GDP is statistically significant at a 1% threshold, meaning that Brazilian MNCs 
invest more in large economies. These results give some support to the market-seeking 
hypothesis, suggesting that Brazilian MNCs are more likely oriented to invest in host markets 
with a growing demand and a higher level of economic openness, measured by a proxy of 
trade flows between the host and home countries. A negative correlation between OFDI and 
the real exchange rate means that the more the real is over evaluated, the higher OFDI. Since 
GDP per inhabitant is not significant, Brazilian OFDI is not basically attracted to the most 
developed countries and spreads to less developed countries as well. 
The above model includes a cultural distance often suggested to be an explanatory variable of 
Brazilian firms‟ investment abroad. Cyrino et al. (2010) go further in considering the psychic 
distance as a major determinant of Brazilian companies‟ OFDI referring to Vahlne and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1973). Psychic distance is a broader concept than cultural distance and 
includes different administrative, economic and legal systems, as well as language and 
religious differences. The path of Brazilian companies‟ OFDI is coherent with the gradualist 
                                                          
14
 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, 




perspective of the behavioural approach to internationalisation which states that companies 
choose to enter countries in terms of psychic distance in order to accumulate experience in 
those markets before entering successively more distant countries, in line with the Uppsala 
school (Johanson & Vahlne, 1992). Amal et al. check a high correlation between cultural and 
geographical distance on the one hand and, on the other hand, institutional indicators. This 
suggests that Brazilian MNCs are more involved in host countries exhibiting an improved 
institutional environment in terms of business climate, political stability, law enforcement, 
and government effectiveness. This is confirmed by the significance of institutional variables 
(except RQi) which means that a positive institutional environment in host country affects 
positively the investment strategy of Brazilian MNCs. 
 
5.2. The determinants of Indian OFDI 
 
The research on the determinants of India‟s OFDI has triggered a greater number of 
publications than for Brazil, China and Russia so far. Some of the most representative studies 
are sampled here since an exhaustive survey would have gone beyond the scope of this paper. 
The determinants that are looked for are pull factors in host countries. 
Anwar, Hasse & Rabbi (2008) have tested the following relationship between OFDI and six 
explanatory variables: 
LogYi = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 +β X +β3 X3 +β4 X4 +β5 X5 + β6 X6 + μ (3) 
where logYi stands for the log of OFDI volume in year i; X1 for host country‟s real GDP in $ 
billion; X2 for real GDP per capita; X3 for host country‟s real GDP rate of growth; X4 for the 
real exchange rate of the host country‟s currency into US dollar; X5 for the geographical 
distance between New Dehli and the host country‟s capital; X6 for real GDP deflator in host 
country (% change); and μ is the error term which accounts for all the omitted variables that 
may affect OFDI. 
The results obtained from econometric testing are: the relationship between OFDI by Indian 
MNCs and host country‟s real GDP is positive and significant at 5% threshold; the real 
exchange rate of the host country‟s currency is positively but not significantly related to 
Indian OFDI: it cannot be concluded that Indian MNCs invest in those countries with stronger 
currencies. The coefficient of the distance to the host country capital is negative and 
significant: the further a country from New Dehli the lower Indian OFDI, which explains the 
latter‟s location primarily in neighbouring countries. Since the real GDP deflator in host 
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country is positively related to Indian OFDI, Indian MNCs are attracted in inflationary 
countries. 
In the same vein, Anwar & Mughal (2012) tested whether economic freedom in a host 
country has a positive impact on attracting Indian OFDI. The relationship between OFDI and 
economic freedom is found highly significant (at a 1% threshold) for all regions except 
Europe and the group of OECD countries for which it is significant at 5 %. The relationship 
for North America, even though with a similar sign, is found statistically non significant. The 
latter result may be due to the small number of observations for the region. In addition, Indian 
OFDI to all regions is strongly influenced by a prior experience of Indian investment in the 
region, indicating that Indian OFDI appears to be driven by prior knowledge of these markets 
(market-seeking confirmed). The relationship with linguistic affinity is positive. Other results 
show that government size, tax incentives, ease of trade, credit regulation, access to sound 
money and business regulations are among the most important determinants of Indian OFDI 
whereas the security of property rights and inflation are less important drivers.   
Using a basic gravity model augmented with a selection of explanatory variables Hattari & 
Rajan (2008) studied the drivers of bilateral FDI flows among Asian developing countries 
while Rajan (2009), with a same methodology and a same selection of explanatory variables, 
introduced a country dummy to test the drivers of Indian OFDI. The basic specification is:  
Ln (FDIijt) = 0 + 1 ln (GDPit)  + 2 ln (GDPjt) + 3 ln (DISTij) +4  Xijt + i + t + ijt (4) 
where FDIijt stands for the real FDI flow from home country i to host country j in time t; 
GDPit and GDPjt respectively stand for home and host country‟s real GDP in US dollar in 
time t; DISTij for the geographical distance between home and host countries; Xijt is a vector 
of other explanatory variables influencing FDI outflows; i stands for the unobservable type 
of home country effects; t for unobservable time effects (year dummies); and ijt for a 
nuisance term. The basic set of explanatory variables encapsulated in Xijt are: bilateral real 
exchange rate of a home country‟s with host country‟s currency; R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of host country‟s GDP, energy production in host country, a ratio of market 
capitalisation to host country‟s GDP, and a ratio of total trade to GDP in host country. 
Explanatory variables are interacted with an India dummy as the home country to examine 
whether the motives for India‟s FDI outflows differ from those in the rest of the sampled 
countries. The sample is based on a panel of annual data on 57 home and 57 host countries 
between 2000 and 2005. 
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The outcome of econometric testing is that the distance variable is statistically significant. A 
greater distance between home and host countries lowers OFDI flows. Physical distance may 
be a proxy for transaction costs, time zone differences and/or information gaps. Larger host 
countries experience more FDI inflows from India. The result regarding bilateral real 
exchange rates against the rupee is inconclusive. OFDI flows to host countries with higher 
R&D spending as a share of GDP and with abundant natural resource endowment and where 
stock market capitalisation is important. With regards to Indian OFDI (using the India 
dummy) three findings are noticeable. First, the real exchange rate appears statistically 
significant – a rise in the host country‟s real exchange rate vis-à-vis the rupee reduces OFDI 
from India. Second, there is some evidence that Indian OFDI is relatively more market-
seeking and somewhat less R&D-seeking than OFDI from other Asian countries in the 
sample. Third, Indian MNCs appear to be as much resource-seeking as their counterparts from 
other countries. 
In a further work, Hattari & Rajan (2010) tested another specification of the gravity model: 
Ln (FDIijt) = 0 +  ln (GDPit) +  ln (GDPjt) + 3 LANGijt + 4 COLONYijt + 5 
DISTij +  
6 Xijt + j + t + ijt  (5) 
with the same notations as in (4), and where LANGij is a binary variable equal to one if the 
two economies share a common official language; COLONYij is a binary variable equal to one 
if the two economies have a past colonial relationship; and j stands for the unobservable type 
of home country effects. 
The set of explanatory variables Xijt used is: the bilateral real exchange rate between the home 
and host countries‟ currencies; gross secondary school enrollment in host country; R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in host country; energy production in host country; the 
ratio of market capitalisation to GDP in host country; the ratio of total trade to GDP in host 
country; a binary variable equal to unity if the two economies have a free-trade agreement 
(FTA); the log of bilateral exports from home to host country; and the level of capital account 
openness in home country. The India dummy is interacted with explanatory variables to 
examine whether the motives for India‟s FDI outflows differ from those of the rest of the 
world on the same data panel as for (4).  
Econometric results are basically the same as in (4) as regards the following variables: 
distance, a common official language, a past colonial relationship, bilateral real exchange rate, 
R&D spending, natural resource abundance, and stock market capitalisation. A better pool of 
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educated workers is positive and significant, a home country invest more in a host country if 
the latter has a higher degree of trade openness and has had more intensive bilateral trade 
relations. However, a bilateral FTA is not statistically significant. With the India dummy, the 
gravity model variables (size and distance) remain highly robust, suggesting that drivers of 
OFDI from Indian corporations are not that different from their Asian counterparts. Again, 
there is evidence that Indian OFDI is more market-seeking, somewhat less R&D-seeking, and 
much more resource-seeking than OFDI from other countries in the sample.  
Nunnenkamp et al. (2012) found that market-related factors, rather than motives to access raw 
materials or superior technologies, have dominated the location choices of Indian MNCs. 
India‟s OFDI proves relatively resilient to weak institutions and economic instability in host 
countries. Variants of the following equation have been tested: 
FDIit =  +  Xit +  Xi + t + i + it (6) 
where the vector Xit comprises variables that vary by host country and over time: GDP, GDP 
per capita, GDP growth, inflation, trade openness, the ratio between current FDI stock and 
GDP, the Heritage index, the existence of a bilateral investment (or tax) treaty, and in some 
specifications the natural resource endowment and patents relative to population. The vector 
Xi comprises time-invariant host country characteristics: distance, the size of Indian diaspora 
in country i, and whether there is a common language. A set of year dummies t is included in 
all specifications and a set of host country dummies i is included in the fixed effects models. 
Mauritius and offshore financial centers listed in Eurostat are not taken on board in the sample 
since these financial centers are assumed to attract FDI mainly for reasons of tax evasion.  
The impact of independent variables on location choices proves to be weak for the overall 
sample. Most strikingly, no evidence is found for either horizontal or vertical FDI choices. 
Horizontal FDI should be reflected in significantly positive coefficients of the size and growth 
of host country markets, while vertical FDI should be reflected in significantly negative 
coefficients of the average per-capita income in the host countries and significantly positive 
coefficients of their openness to trade. All coefficients for these variables are statistically non 
significant. 
Results are ambiguous with respect to the hypothesis that India‟s OFDI should be resilient to 
political uncertainty, weak institutions and economic instability in host countries. On the one 
hand, the positive coefficient for inflation, suggesting that economically less stable host 
countries with higher inflation rates receive more FDI from India, supports this hypothesis. 
On the other hand, the positive coefficient on Heritage index is in conflict with the hypothesis. 
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Better governance and institutions as reflected in higher values of the Heritage index attract 
more FDI from India
15
. Since the index ranges from one to 100, one point improvement in 
economic freedom lead to an increase in FDI flows by 0.19%. A dummy variable equal to one 
for English speaking host countries is not significant. However, the presence of an Indian 
diaspora in host country is significantly positive
16
. The variables introduced to capture vertical 
and asset-seeking FDI suggest that both types of OFDI played a minor role during the period 
under consideration (1996-2009). No evidence is found that India‟s OFDI is strongly 
motivated by access to raw materials in resource-rich host countries or access to superior 
technology in advanced host countries, or in host countries with lower per-capita income. 
Market-related factors appear to have dominated location choices of Indian MNCs in the past. 
Finally, both Brazilian and Indian OFDI are more market-seeking than asset- and resource-
seeking, has developed countries as their first pecking order, then neighbouring countries and 
tax havens, just like Russian and Chinese OFDI (Andreff, 2014).  Push factors are significant 
for Brazilian MNCs and not tested so far for Indian MNCs. Linguistic (cultural) proximity, 
sound investment regulations, good governance and institutions play a role in both cases 
while Indian MNCs are not reluctant to enter inflationary countries, and are attracted by host 
country‟s economic freedom. Here some differences emerge as compared with Russian and 
primarily Chinese MNCs.  
 
6. Brazilian and Indian government policy vis-à-vis home-based multinationals 
Compared with the huge government interference in the strategy of Chinese MNCs or the 
Russian government watchword incentive policy addressed to Russian MNCs (Andreff, 
2014), Brazilian and Indian MNCs are less supported by the government while they are not 
used as a tool for home country‟s economic and foreign policy or diplomacy.  
 
6.1. Brazilian economic policies that affect outward foreign direct investment 
 
                                                          
15
 An efficient governance system in host countries is tested as attracting higher Indian OFDI (Garcia-Herrero & 
Deorukhkar, 2014). However, when controlling for Indian OFDI located in offshore financial centers, the host 
country‟s ability to control corruption is not a significant determinant of Indian OFDI. 
16
 That diaspora plays a crucial role in augmenting Indian OFDI through facilitating acquisition and exchange of 
technical know-how, market information and physical capital is also tested significant and positive by Anwar & 
Mughal (2013).  
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Brazilian government does not strongly interfere in the internationalisation of Brazilian firms; 
it has not designed a policy heavily targeting OFDI. However, some economic policies aim at 
helping the development of Brazilian MNCS like a privileged credit policy launched in 2002 
and the creation of a sovereign fund while other policies do affect it indirectly such as the 
(former) privatisation process, trade liberalisation, a competitiveness policy geared towards 
Brazilian firms, and the exchange rate policy. 
A/ Special lines of credit are offered by the Brazilian National Development Bank – BNDES 
– to Brazilian companies that invest abroad and have played an active role in the 
internationalisation of local companies. BNDES started increasing credit lines for domestic 
firms in 1994 and created a specific line to support their outward expansion in 2002. Since 
then the Bank operates a credit line called “Investimento Direto Externo” (literally Foreign 
Direct  Investment) to stimulate investment abroad by Brazilian MNCs, offering interest rates 
lower than market‟s and covering the construction of new installations abroad, acquisition of 
equipment, M&As, turnover capital, and export support (Campanario et al., 2011). In 2009, as 
a counter-cyclical policy intervention, BNDES lent US$ 8 billion to foster the expansion of 
Brazilian MNCs in agribusiness, capital goods, construction, engineering, consumer 
electronics, energy, technical services, and IT. However Brazilian MNCs‟ access to domestic 
finance is still limited and most have to use their own capital or rely on foreign funding.  
B/ Another policy initiative was the creation in December 2008 of a Brazilian sovereign 
wealth fund (Fundo Soberano do Brazil, FSB), a state-owned investment fund, to maximise 
long-term returns by investing some of Brazil‟s foreign exchange reserves. This fund has a 
higher risk tolerance than official funds managed by monetary authorities, such as BNDES 
and the Central Bank. The FSB objective is to increase strategic Brazilian trans-border M&As 
and greenfield projects in response to new investment opportunities abroad. 
C/ The process of companies‟ internationalisation in Latin American countries are due to 
privatisation and economic liberalisation that followed the exhaustion of the import-
substitution industrialisation model. However, there is no direct industrial policy to support 
the new MNCs in these countries. Brazil is no exception. Privatisation of industries such as 
steel, energy, mining, chemical products, and telecommunications in Brazil and other Latin 
American economies all over the 1990s have stimulated OFDI from Brazil in those industries. 
Privatisation in Brazil in the 1990s promoted the creation of national champions that later 
became large MNCs. In Brazil, the privatisation drive intended to create large, specialised, 
restructured and publicly-listed firms such as Vale, Embraer and Petrobras; however the 
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government still holds controlling shares in Petrobras, as well as golden shares in Vale and 
Embraer that provide control over their strategy and would probably prevent takeovers. 
D/ In the 1990s, together with a reversal of the former import substitution strategy, the Collor 
administration promoted a wide trade liberalisation effort that has increased the exposure of 
domestic firms to competition, though in a disorderly manner. The result was one of 
promoting internal competition. The Mercosur devices implemented in 1994 have contributed 
to increased access into Brazilian market in that period. This indirectly encouraged FDI both 
ways, inward and outward. A steady reduction in tax barriers to imports, mainly in capital 
goods and consumer goods industries, has opened the country to higher levels of international 
trade, particularly imports of capital goods. Consequently industrial productivity increased 
and competitiveness of Brazilian enterprises strengthened home and abroad.  
E/ A next step into competitiveness policy consisted in incentives for mergers of domestic 
firms offered by BNDES which indirectly helped to promote the internationalisation of 
Brazilian firms by facilitating the creation of large MNCs, most notably in the past ten years. 
Thus, despite the lack of a crystal clear investment policy and tax incentives to promote 
OFDI, Brazil has emerged as Latin America‟s main source of FDI. Campanario et al. (2011) 
contend that now FDI stimulus by means of public policies may contribute to a better 
competitiveness and innovation of Brazilian enterprises. Economic policies that would 
strengthen international capital flows might improve the competitiveness of Brazilian MNCs 
as well as help to better regulate the fluctuations of the exchange rate, attract foreign savings 
and make the best of Brazilian foreign trade. Policy-making takes place in an institutional 
environment in which there are no generally accepted norms or rules to construct policy 
measures and instruments to deal with inward or outward FDI. Brazil has yet to develop, on a 
sufficient scale, efficient mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of contracts in the 
international arena. 
F/ The appreciation of real lasted from the mid-1990s to 1999 and was relevant not only to 
curb inflation, but also to trigger a fierce competitive pressure over domestic producers. An 
exchange rate anchor between 1995 and 1998 was responsible for a strong real. After the 
administered regime was relaxed in 1999, the currency floated and weakened through 2002. 
However the quite favourable international environment helped both exports and inward-
outward capital flows in the following years until the exchange rate plummeted with the 2008 
crisis. Nevertheless, the impact of exchange rate policy on OFDI must not be overemphasised 
since it has been tested as non significant by Concer et al. (2010).  
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6.2. Indian government policies toward outward foreign direct investment 
India being a current account deficit economy, there is a need to closely monitor the country‟s 
capital outflows. Like most oil importing less developed countries India was a capital scarce 
economy; moreover it introduced a planning system to force rapid economic development in 
the 1950s. Consequently, hard (foreign) currencies were in shortage and any OFDI by Indian 
firms was therefore subject to state permission (Agarwal, 1985). Before 1969 such permission 
was given only in exceptional cases. In the 1980s, Indian government granted incentives to 
OFDI through financial assistance, concessional loans from the Industrial Development Bank 
of India, and a number of tax exemptions. 
Since 1991, alongside with the liberalisation of policy geared toward inward FDI, the policy 
governing OFDI has also been liberalised. Industrial reforms like dismantling of industrial 
licensing policy, deregulation, privatisation and disinvestment; trade reforms affecting the 
exchange rate regime, reduction in import tariffs, removal of quantitative restrictions on 
imports and full convertibility of the rupee in current account; and liberalisation in FDI policy 
like national treatment to foreign firms, opening up of many sectors hitherto closed to FDI, 
instituting automatic approval route and other reform measures significantly changed the 
business environment in domestic market. A number of Indian firms like Tata (Goldstein, 
2008) had to face global competition since the opening-up of the Indian economy in 1991, 
making it imperative to become competitive against the new entrants, first in India, then 
through investing abroad. Indian companies were compelled to adapt to foreign investors‟ 
entrance in domestic market namely through linkages, alliances and JVs with them, 
leveraging resources on them, imitating and learning from them
17
, and eventually investing 
abroad like them. Indian MNCs are very often mentioned as fitting well with the LLL –
Linkage, Leverage and Learning – approach (Matthews, 2002).  
The Guidelines for Indian Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries was emended in 
1992, 1999 and 2002, and provided for automatic approval of OFDI proposals up to $2 
million in 1992, $15 million in 1995 and $100 million in 2002 (and up to $150 million for 
OFDI in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation countries - excluding Pakistan - 
and Myanmar)
18
. In 2004 the limit was removed and Indian MNCs are now permitted to 
                                                          
17
 Singal & Jain (2012) stressed that Indian firms built up strategic capacity to invest abroad through strategic 
alliances, JVs and technology acquisition.  
18
 Singh & Jain (2009) underline the role of Indian state policy to encourage OFDI.  
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invest abroad up to 100% of their net worth on an automatic basis. The Prime Minister of 
India announced in January 2004 that "Indian corporations will hereafter be freely permitted 
to make overseas investments up to 100% of their net worth, whether through an overseas 
joint venture or a wholly owned subsidiary. This will enable Indian companies to take 
advantage of global opportunities and also to acquire technological and other skills for 
adoption in India". In the past recent years, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) adopted a 
number of norms for OFDI, including raising the overseas investment limit from 100% then 
300% to 400% of the net worth under the automatic route. Indian MNCs were allowed to 
invest in energy and natural resources sectors (oil, gas, coal and mineral ores) in excess of the 
current limits with the prior approval of the RBI. A three year profitability requirement was 
removed for Indian companies making OFDI under the automatic route. Furthermore, Indian 
MNCs can now invest or buy assets abroad in areas unrelated to their business at home. 
In the second half of the 2000s, the overall foreign exchange reserve position provided 
comfort to progressive relaxation of capital controls and simplification of procedures for 
OFDI from India. OFDI must still be considered by an inter-Ministerial group in (formerly 
forbidden) banking sector and real estate activities. In 2005, access of Indian MNCs in 
international capital markets was also progressively liberalised; they were allowed to float 
international special purpose vehicles in international capital markets to finance their trans-
border M&As. Earlier, Indian firms had to compensate for foreign exchange outflows with 
matching export earnings. They are now allowed to borrow abroad to finance OFDI, and to 
use domestic bank borrowing for the same purpose. In 2006, the prudential limit on bank 
financing was raised from 10% to 20% of overseas investment. Banks in India were also 
allowed in 2007 to extend funded and/or non-funded credit facilities to wholly owned step-
down subsidiaries of subsidiaries of Indian companies (where the Indian company holds 51% 
or more) abroad.  
In June 2011, the Reserve Bank allowed Indian parties to disinvest their stake abroad without 
prior approval, where the amount repatriated on disinvestment is less than the amount of the 
original investment, subject to certain conditions. The Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion has identified South East Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa as zones where Indian 
MNCs would be encouraged to acquire assets as well as buy-out of companies. Also, in 2011, 
the Government of India approved a policy to support raw material asset purchases made by 
select public sector undertakings abroad. However beyond this OFDI liberalising regulation 
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framework, from time to time the RBI cuts the maximum OFDI allowed to companies and 
individuals in order to bolster the rupee as, for example, in August 2013.  
Unlike state-driven Chinese OFDI and some Russian OFDI, Indian OFDI has been primarily 
led by private enterprises except a few state-owned firms operating in the energy sector 
(Pradhan, 2010). Moreover China has used OFDI in developing countries to enhance her 
foreign policy objectives (Andreff, 2014). China has been able to wield this “soft power” very 
effectively as OFDI have generally been driven by state-owned MNCs. As against this, with 
the exception of the energy sector, India‟s OFDI has been driven largely by private initiative, 
with little coordination with the government. Indeed, in some sense, India‟s first wave of 
liberalisation, geared toward “assisting partners from the South”, and enhancing South-South 
cooperation and the Non-Aligned movement, was arguably more obviously aimed at using its 
soft power in the conventional sense. In contrast, OFDI in the post-liberalisation period is 
targeted at buying existing firms in developed countries for various strategic and 
competitiveness considerations without any soft power implication.  
7. Conclusion 
Taking stake of the above comparison of OFDI strategies and determinants between Brazilian 
and Indian MNCS together, and with previous results about Russian and Chinese MNCs, it is 
now possible to conclude with an overall comparative view of OFDI features by BRICs‟ 
MNCs (Table 13). 
Table 13 about here 
 
First, there are four basic characteristics of OFDI run by all BRICs‟ MNCs: a/ they are 
primarily undertaken in market-seeking strategies, b/ privileging close neighbouring markets, 
and c/ resorting to trans-border mergers and acquisitions more than greenfield investment, d/ 
in particular when OFDI is geared toward developed countries‟ markets. To a lesser extent 
four other features are common to all BRICs‟ MNCs: e/ beyond market-seeking, all BRICs 
have home-based MNCs investing abroad in a resource-seeking perspective, f/ in the primary 
sector, and g/ the share of the tertiary sector (services) is significant in overall OFDI while h/ 
the expansion of BRICs‟ MNCs has been eased in the past decade by the home country 
foreign reserve accumulation.  
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Now, some traits oppose Brazilian and Indian MNCs on the one hand to, on the other hand, a 
sort of legacy from the past inherited by „post-communist‟ Russian and Chinese MNCs. 
Round tripping and capital flight OFDI seem to be much less significant from Brazil-India 
than from Russia-China. Brazilian and Indian MNCs have benefitted from linkage, leverage 
and learning when competing with foreign inward investors into their home market whereas 
this approach was less obvious with Chinese MNCs and not at all with Russian MNCs. The 
proportion of state-owned MNCs is lower among Brazilian-Indian MNCs as compared with 
the Russian-Chinese ones, thus fewer MNC managers are appointed by the state in the former 
than the latter. State support to OFDI promotion in Brazil-India cannot compare with Russia-
China where OFDI, beyond its economic dimension, is used as a tool for foreign policy and 
diplomacy. Though not absent in Brazil-India, state interference and control over OFDI is less 
invasive than in Russia-China, and less fuelled by national pride and state ideology. 
 In all other dimensions listed in Table 13, MNCs from each BRIC are rather specific. Let us 
outline this point with a face-to-face comparison between Brazilian and Indian MNCs. 
Efficiency-seeking is probably a secondary target of some Indian MNCs whereas it is hardly 
detected in Brazilian MNCs. The latter are nearly not pursuing technological asset-seeking 
while the former really are involved in such strategy though less than Russian-Chinese MNCs 
because Indian MNCs already are on the technological frontier in some industries like 
pharmaceuticals and IT services. For quite clear geographical reasons, Brazilian OFDI is 
geared toward Latin America contrary to Indian OFDI which is more oriented to Asia and 
Africa in a more general context where Indian MNCs (just like Chinese MNCs) are investing 
in the other neighbouring BRICs, Russia and China, but also in Brazil. Brazil has not a 
remarkable share of its OFDI settled in other BRICs, just like Russia. The privatisation drive 
has acted as a starter in the internationalisation process of some Brazilian companies whereas 
it is liberalisation and deregulation in home economy that have boosted OFDI by already 
internationalised Indian firms but with triggering their geographical diversification toward 
developed countries. Indian MNCs are more threatened by foreign competitors in domestic 
market which contrasts with some local monopoly positions of Brazilian MNCs; this may lead 
to possibly more transparent corporate governance in the former than the latter while resorting 
to informal practices and corruption may not be that much different in both. Two last striking 
contrasts are the significant share of manufacturing industry in overall OFDI from India 
(much lower a share in Brazil) and the role of exchange rate appreciation of the Brazilian real 
in boosting OFDI (in the 1990s).  
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A face-to-face detailed comparison between each pair of BRICs with regards to their 
multinational companies would be of outmost interest but it is beyond the scope of the present 
paper and thus opens an avenue for further research. 
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Table 1: Similarities and differences between Russian and Chinese multinationals 
OFDI features and MNCs strategies Russian MNCs Chinese MNCs 
Market-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Resource-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Efficiency-seeking strategy -- -- 
Asset-seeking strategy ++ ++ 
Global strategy (being on the brink of) -- -- 
Transborder mergers & acquisitions ++ ++ 
Round tripping OFDI + ++ 
Capital flight OFDI + -- 
Preliminary LLL role of inward FDI -- + 
Privileging close markets for OFDI ++ ++ 
OFDI in developed countries' markets + + 
OFDI in Latin America -- + 
OFDI in Africa + ++ 
Mutual bilateral FDI* -- ++ 
FDI on reciprocal privileged markets** -- + 
Proportion of SOEs among big MNCs + ++ 
MNCs originating in the privatisation drive ++ -- 
Monopoly/dominant oligopoly in home market ++ + 
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State appointment of SOEs/MNCs managers ++ ++ 
MNC corporate governance transparency -- -- 
State (government) support to OFDI + ++ 
Institutional (state) OFDI promotion -- + 
State interference/control in OFDI ++ + 
Informal institutions, corruption, networks ++ ++ 
National pride and state ideology + ++ 
OFDI in the primary sector (oil, mining, etc.) ++ + 
OFDI in the manufacturing industry + + 
OFDI in the tertiary sector + ++ 
State foreign reserve accumulation + ++ 
Exchange rate appreciation 0 + 
(++) + = (very) strong or significant 0 = absent  
 -- = weak or of secondary importance   
* Chinese OFDI in Russia and Russian OFDI in China  
** Chinese OFDI in Russian "close abroad" and Russian OFDI in China's close Asia 
 




      
         BRICs: 1997 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brazil 7230 51946 129840 162218 157667 180949 202586 232848 
India 846 1859 29412 61765 77207 92407 111257 118167 
Russia 6410 20141 255211 202837 248894 433655 362101 413159 
China (mainland) 20416 27212 95799 147949 229600 297600 365981 509001 
China and Hong Kong 157928 411944 1122386 923869 1063689 1246094 1411901 1818850 
Source: UNCTAD (2013) and previous issues. 
       




    
       BRICs: Outward FDI stock / Outward / Inward FDI 
  GDP     stock     
  1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 
Brazil 1.4 9.9 9.0 7.4 40.0 30.3 
India 0* 2.6 6.0 6.5 38.6 55.2 
Russia 2.3 19.8 19.5 51.9 75.4 79.2 
China 2.5 3.0 5.0 8.4 29.3 51.4 
China & Hong Kong 15.9 30.3 18.7 45.3 74.3 76.3 
* Below 0.1% 
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Calculated from UNCTAD's World Investment Reports. 
   
Table 4 - BRICs outward FDI and economic crisis: rate of growth 
  
         2007/2000 2008/2007 2009/2008 2010/2009 2011/2010 2012/2011 
Brazil x 2.5 24.9% - 2.8% 14.8% 12.0% 14.9% 
India x 16 110% 25.0% 19.7% 20.4% 6.2% 
Russia x 13 - 20.5% 22.7% 74.2% - 16.5% 14.1% 
China  x 3.5 54.4% 55.2% 29.6% 23.0% 39.1% 
China & Hong Kong x 2.7 - 17.7% 15.1% 17.1% 13.3% 28.8% 
World OFDI x 2.5 3.9% 17.1% 7.5% 3.7% 11.3% 
Calculated from UNCTAD (2013) and previous issues.  
    




    Company Industry Foreign  Foreign  





Itau-Unibanco (Itausa) Banking 50.0 75.2 
Vale Mining 46.1 55.6 
Odebrecht Construction 24.4 n.a. 
Petrobras Oil and gas 20.4 17.9 
Gerdau Steel 14.3 15.1 
Grupo Votorantim Conglomerate 9.1 15.8 
JBS-Friboi Food 9.1 10.7 
Embraer Aerospace 3.7 3.1 
CSN Steel 2.2 n.a. 
Marfrig Food 1.4 2.5 
Andrade Guttierez Construction 0.7 n.a. 
Brasil Foods Food 0.6 3.6 
Marco Polo Automotive 0.5 0.2 
WEG Machinery 0.4 0.8 
FIBRIA Pulp and paper 0.3 n.a. 
Braskem Chemicals 0.1 n.a. 
Metalfrio Electrical equipment 0.1 n.a. 
Natura Cosmetics 0.1 0.04 
Lupatech Machinery 0.1 n.a. 
ALL Logistica Railroad transportation 0.1 n.a. 
Totvs Information technology 0.02 n.a. 
Bematech Information technology 0.002 n.a. 
Banco do Brazil Banking n.a. 32.7 
Bradesco Banking n.a. 26.2 
Industrias Romi Machinery n.a. 0.8 
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Magnesita Mining n.a. 0.7 
Source: Columbia FDI Profiles 
   








Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil and gas 4700 
Tata Group Conglomerate 4200 
Videocon Industries Conglomerate 1600 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Pharmaceuticals 1000 
Dr. Reddy‟s Laboratories Pharmaceuticals 870 
HCL Technologies IT services 780 
Hindalco Industries Aluminum manufacturing 580 
Sun Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 280 
Reliance Industries Oil and gas 250 
Suzlon Energy Power and energy 140 
Larsen and Toubro Engineering, construction 130 
WIPRO Technologies IT services 130 
Bharat Forge Auto component forging 110 
Patni Computer Systems IT services 81 
Hexaware Technologies IT services 70 
Biocon Limited Pharmaceuticals 50 
i-Gate Global Solutions IT services 49 
Max India Limited Conglomerate 37 
Mahindra & Mahindra Automotive 35 
NIIT Limited IT services 31 
Piramal Healthcare Limited Pharmaceuticals 26 
Birlasoft (India) Limited IT services 21 
Raymond Limited Fabric manufacturing 18 
Infosys Technologies Limited IT services 9 
Source: Satyanand & Raghavendran (2010). 
 
 
 Table 7 - Significant transborder mergers-acquisitions 
   achieved by Brazilian companies, 2008-2010 
    
      Brazilian Acquired  Target  Industry acquired Value 
acquirer company country   % $ million 
Vale  BSRG Resources Guinea UK Ferroalloy ores 51 2500 
Marfrig Keystone Foods USA Meat packing 100 1260 
Votorantim Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 17 982 
DH&C Outsourcing Diveo Broadband Networks USA Information, data 100 422 
Votorantim Métais Cia Minera Milpo Peru Copper ores 15 419 
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Petrobras Pasadena Refining System USA Petroleum refining 50 350 
Braskem Sunoco Chemicals USA Chemicals 100 350 
Votorantim Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 4 210 
Petrobras Devon Energy Corp-Cascade USA Petroleum and gas 50 180 
Camargo Corrêa Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 3 180 
Banco Itau Holding Banco Itau Europa Portugal Security services 89 498 
Petrobras Esso Chile Petrolera Chile Petroleum refining n.a. 400 
Vale  Cementos Argos Colombia Cement, hydraulic 100 373 
Votorantim Cementos Avellaneda Argentina Cement  50 202 
Banco Bradesco Banco Espirito Santo Portugal Banking 6 32 
Suzano Holding MDS SGPS Portugal Insurance 50 71 
Vale  TEAL Exploration & Mining Canada Copper ores 50 66 
Marfrig Grupo Zenda Uruguay Leather products 51 49 
Petrobras Chevron Chile Chile Petroleum and coal 100 12 
JBS-Friboi Pilgrim's Pride  USA Food 64 3 
Gerdau Quanex Corp USA Steel 100 1749 
Magnesita LWB Refractories Germany Brick and clay tile 100 944 
JBS-Friboi Smithfield Beef Group USA Beef cattle 100 565 
JBS-Friboi Inalca Italy Meat products 50 425 
Votorantim Métais US Zinc Corp USA Nonferrous metals 100 295 
Gerdau Corporacion Sidenor Spain Steel 20 287 
AmBev Quilmes Industrial Argentina Malt beverages 6 252 
JBS-Friboi Tasman Group Services Australia Meat packing 100 150 
Gerdau Corsa Controladora Mexico Steel 49 101 
Source: Campanario, Stal & Silva (2012).  
     
Table 8 - Significant transborder mergers and acquisisitons 
   achieved by Indian companies, 2006-2010 
    
      Indian Acquired  Target Industry Acquired Value 
acquirer company country   % 
$ 
million 
Mittal Steel Arcelor Luxembourg Metals & mining 100 47440 
Tata Steel Corus Group 
United 
Kingdom Metals & mining 100 14850 
Bharti Airtel Zain Africa* Telecom 100 9000 
Hindalco Industries Novelis Canada Metals & mining 100 6000 
ONGC Imperial Energy 
United 
Kingdom Energy & power 100 2800 
Sterlite Industries India Asarco United States Mining n.a. 2600 
Tata Motors Jaguar & Land Rover 
United 
Kingdom Automotive 100 2300 
Suzlon Energy Repower Systems Germany energy & power 66 1700 
Essar Global Algoma Steel Canada Metals & mining 100 1570 
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ONGC Petrobras Brazil Oil and gas n.a. 1400 
Tata Power Kaltim Prima Coal Indonesia Metals & mining 30 1300 
United Spirits Whyte and Mackay 
United 
Kingdom Food, beverage 100 1180 
Tata Power PT Bumi Resources Thailand Energy & power n.a. 1100 
GMR Infrastructure Intergen  Netherlands Energy & power 50 1100 
Tata Chemicals 
General Chemical 
Industrial United States 
Plastic, 
chemicals 100 1100 
JSW Steel Jindal United Steel United States Metals & mining 90 900 
HCL EAS Axon Group 
United 
Kingdom IT & ITES 100 800 
Wipro Infocrossing United States IT & ITES 100 600 
Rain Calcining CII Carbon United States Energy & power 100 600 
DS Constructions Globeleq Bermuda Energy & power 100 600 
Dr Reddy's Laboratories Betapharm Germany Parmaceuticals n.a. 582 
Tata Tea Tetley Group 
United 
Kingdom Food, beverage n.a. 431 
Videocon/Bharat Petro Encana Brasil Petroleo Brazil Energy & power 50 400 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Trapia Romania Parmaceuticals n.a. 324 
Firstsource Solutions MedAssist United States IT & ITES 100 300 
Reliance 
Communications Yipes Holding United States Telecom 100 300 
Videocon Appliances Thomson Multimedia France  IT & ITES n.a. 292 
Wockhardt Negma Laboratories France  Parmaceuticals 100 265 
Jubilant Organosys Draxis Health Canada Pharmaceuticals n.a. 258 
Kiri Dyes and Chemicals DyStar Group Germany 
Plastic, 
chemicals 100 200 
Essar Group Warid Telecom Uganda/Congo Telecom 51 200 
United Phosphorus Cerexagri France  Chemicals n.a. 142 
Subex Systems Azure Solutions 
United 
Kingdom Technology n.a. 140 
Inox India 
Cryogenic Vessel 
Initiatives United States Logistics 51 100 
S. Kumar's Hartmarx United States 
Textiles, 
apparels 100 100 
* In 17 African countries 
     Sources: UNCTAD, Hattari & Rajan (2010).   
     
Table 9 - Outward FDI stock from Brazil: geographical distribution   
  ($ million and %)    
       
Host  2007  2010  2012  
countries stock % stock % stock  % 
Austria 31212 28.0 37092 21.9 56618 22.9 
Cayman Islands 16431 14.8 29466 17.4 40264 16.3 
Netherlands 2160 1.9 10785 6.4 28186 11.4 
British Virgin Islands 11245 10.1 14724 8.7 22291 9.0 
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United States 6063 5.4 13184 7.8 18401 7.4 
Spain 4083 3.7 8992 5.3 15376 6.2 
Luxembourg 4259 3.8 4794 2.8 14719 6.0 
Bahamas 9341 8.4 12353 7.3 14500 5.9 
Argentina 2360 2.1 5148 3.0 5511 2.2 
Hungary 901 0.8 2489 1.5 3207 1.3 
Peru 584 0.5 2254 1.3 2986 1.2 
Uruguay 1878 1.7 2497 1.5 2951 1.2 
Panama 1185 1.1 1614 1.0 2430 1.0 
Portugal 1493 1.3 3257 1.9 2139 0.9 
Canada 16 0 1976 1.2 1804 0.7 
United Kingdom 805 0.7 929 0.5 1558 0.6 
Netherlands Antilles 1351 1.2 550 0.3 1447 0.6 
France 156 0.1 1006 0.6 1230 0.5 
Chile 509 0.5 574 0.3 1107 0.4 
Venezuela 218 0.2 679 0.4 1083 0.4 
Mexico 175 0.2 528 0.3 1052 0.4 
Angola 73 0.1 44 0 1027 0.4 
Belgium 96 0.1 104 0.1 939 0.4 
Bermudas 599 0.5 577 0.3 851 0.3 
Denmark 12567 11.3 9290 5.5 783 0.3 
Colombia 178 0.2 872 0.5 696 0.3 
Paraguay 117 0.1 262 0.2 578 0.2 
Switzerland 83 0.1 148 0.1 343 0.1 
Virgin Island (USA) 69 0.1 199 0.1 246 0.1 
Germany 135 0.1 110 0.1 225 0.1 
Italy 51 0 444 0.3 191 0.1 
Belize 43 0 114 0.1 173 0.1 
Source: Banco Central do Brazil      
 
Table 10 - Outward FDI stock from India: geographical distribution 
   
   
($ billion and %) 
     
         1996-2002*     2002-2009*       2013**   
Host country OFDI % Host country OFDI % Host  OFDI % 
Russia 1.7 23.8 Singapore 14.2 20.8 Singapore 1161 26.6 
United States 1.5 20.5 Netherlands 10.6 15.4 Mauritius 631 14.5 
British Virgin Islands 0.8 10.3 Mauritius 5.6 8.1 Netherlands 605 13.9 
Mauritius 0.6 8.2 Channel Islands 5.4 7.9 USA 377 8.6 
Hong Kong 0.4 5.9 United Kingdom 5.2 7.6 UAE 232 5.3 
United Kingdom 0.4 5.5 United States 5.1 7.4 Jersey 172 3.9 
Bermuda 0.2 3.1 Cyprus 4.7 6.8 U. K. 119 2.7 
Vietnam 0.2 3.0 United Arab Emirates 2.1 3.1 
   Oman 0.2 2.7 Russia 1.4 2.0 
   Netherlands 0.1 2.1 Sudan 1.2 1.7 
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Singapore 0.1 2.0 Switzerland 1.1 1.6 
   United Arab Emirates 0.1 1.5 China 0.9 1.3 
   Austria 0.1 1.0 British Virgin Islands 0.9 1.2 
   Nepal 0.1 0.9 Egypt 0.8 1.2 
   Sri Lanka 0.1 0.8 Denmark 0.8 1.2 
   * Cumulative stock of outward investment approvals for each period, source: Indian Ministry of Finance. 
 ** Update in $ million, source: Reserve Bank of India. 
      
Table 11: Outward FDI stock from Brazil by industry 
 
($ million) 
   
       2001 2004 2007 2010 
Primary sector 1962 1328 3202 56536 
Mining and quarrying 4 291 373 49621 
Petroleum and gas 1827 723 2658 6769 
Secondry sector 4031 2340 11799 16945 
Food, beverage & tobacco 358 294 1085 5949 
Non metallic products 516 23 1974 4123 
Metallurgy 7 10 1332 3638 
Tertiary sector 44007 65332 124998 107513 
Finance and insurance 24347 35812 80491 69370 
Services to companies 16919 25616 27684 18966 
% primary sector 3.9 1.9 2.3 31.2 
% secondary sector 8.1 3.4 8.4 9.4 
% tertiary sector 88.0 94.7 89.2 59.3 
Source: Banco Central do Brazil 
     
Table 12 - Indian companies' FDI outflows by industry 
  
      Industry 2000 2003 2009 2010 2011 
Total ($ billion) 1.73 1.47 18.58 13.71 16.84 
in %: 
    
  
Primary sector 0.1 4.3 13.5 7.7 8.3 
Secondary sector 30.9 71.8 54.8 39.0 29.9 
Tertiary sector 69.0 23.9 31.7 53.3 61.8 
Finance 0.2 0.1 19.1 32.2 38.8 
Trade 3.4 4.7 6.3 8.2 11.2 
Other services 65.3 19.0 6.3 12.9 11.8 
Source: UNCTAD and Reserve Bank of India.  
    
Table 13: Similarities and differences between Brazilian, Indian, Russian and Chinese 
multinationals 
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OFDI features and strategies of MNCS from: Brazil India Russia China 
Market-seeking strategy ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Resource-seeking strategy ++ + ++ ++ 
Efficiency-seeking strategy -- - -- -- 
Asset-seeking strategy - + ++ ++ 
Global strategy (being on the brink of) -- + -- -- 
Transborder mergers & acquisitions ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Round tripping OFDI - - + ++ 
Capital flight OFDI -- -- + -- 
Preliminary LLL role of inward FDI ++ ++ -- + 
Privileging close markets for OFDI ++ ++ ++ ++ 
OFDI in developed countries' markets ++ ++ + + 
OFDI in Latin America ++ -- -- + 
OFDI in Africa - ++ + ++ 
FDI in other BRICs -- ++ -- ++ 
Proportion of SOEs among big MNCs -- - + ++ 
MNCs originating in the privatisation drive + - + -- 
Monopoly/dominant oligopoly in home market + - ++ + 
State appointment of SOEs/MNCs managers - - ++ ++ 
MNC corporate governance transparency - + -- -- 
State (government) support to OFDI - - + ++ 
Institutional (state) OFDI promotion -- - -- + 
State interference/control in OFDI - - ++ + 
Informal institutions, corruption, networks + - ++ ++ 
National pride and state ideology - - + ++ 
OFDI in the primary sector (oil, mining, etc.) + + ++ + 
OFDI in the manufacturing industry - ++ + + 
OFDI in the tertiary sector + ++ + ++ 
State foreign reserve accumulation + + + ++ 
Exchange rate appreciation + - 0 + 
(++) + = (very) strong or significant 
  
0 = absent 
  -- = weak or of secondary importance 
 
     
